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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

SCALING THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE:
CONFRONTING ISSUES OF EQUALITY STEMMING FROM
FINANCING RELIGIOUSLY AFFILIATED UNIVERSITIES UNDER
DUAL FEDERALISM

“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion. . . .”1
INTRODUCTION
School children all across the country learn this provision of the First
Amendment as the “separation of church and state.” But this provision,
commonly referred to as the Establishment Clause, was not part of the original
drafting of the Constitution, which instead stood silent on the issue of religion.2
This was not an oversight by the framers; rather, the majority believed they
had addressed the concern of religious freedom by expressly excluding it from
the enumerated powers of the new government.3 But not all were convinced
that this exclusion provided an adequate restraint on power.4 The AntiFederalists felt the Constitution gave too much power to the new federal

1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. For an idea of the powers and limits originally placed upon the branches of government,
see the following provisions of the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (providing
a list of enumerated powers for the legislative branch); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (providing several
limits on the powers of Congress); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (explaining that the President’s
executive power includes the role of Commander in Chief over the Army, Navy, and Militia, and
that with the approval of Congress, he has the power to make treaties and judicial appointments);
U.S. CONST. art. III (describing the powers of jurisdiction over certain types of cases of vested in
the Supreme Court).
3. Robert L. Cord & Howard Ball, The Separation of Church and State: A Debate, 1987
UTAH L. REV. 895, 895–96 (1987). James Madison originally opposed the addition of a Bill of
Rights. RICHARD LABUNSKI, JAMES MADISON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BILL OF RIGHTS
159–60 (2006). He believed that rights not expressly given to the new government were
automatically reserved to the people. Id. Furthermore, Madison believed that adding an
amendment regarding religious freedom or any other civil liberty ran the risk of being either too
broad or too narrow. Id.
4. Not all delegates present at the Constitutional Convention and the signing of the original
Constitution were convinced this was adequate. See LABUNSKI, supra note 3, at 10. Even before
the document was sent to the states for their review, and ultimately their ratification, there was
talk of holding a second convention to address shortcomings of the first document. Id.
395
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government and did not adequately protect the individual rights of the people.5
This group refused to support the Constitution unless it contained a separate
Bill of Rights, expressly setting out individual rights to “serve as a barrier
between the central government, the respective states, and their citizens.”6 The
Anti-Federalists ultimately won the debate, and ten amendments survived
congressional debate and state ratification to become the Bill of Rights.7
But, those Amendments are still subject to judicial review and
interpretation, and over the years, the Court has carved out various exceptions.
To see this effect, one need only look at the long history of mixed results from
the Court’s application of the Establishment Clause.8 The variety of issues
considered by the Court over the years includes prayer in school, posting
religious symbols and displays on public property, and school voucher
programs that indirectly fund parochial schools.9 Perhaps one of the hottest
issues in today’s recession-weary society is the constitutionality of granting
public funds to religiously affiliated colleges and universities (RACs). This is
an issue for courts and lawmakers at both the state and federal level.

5. Joyce A. McCray Pearson, The Federal and State Bills of Rights: A Historical Look at
the Relationship Between America’s Documents of Individual Freedom, 36 HOW. L.J. 43, 57
(1993).
6. Id. (quoting GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–
1787, at 536 (1969)). Three key states, the most populous states of the fledgling union,
Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia, initially refused to ratify the new Constitution without
the inclusion of a Bill of Rights. Id. Virginia’s state constitution already included a Declaration
of Rights, which included religious freedom. See id. at 51. This document was a major influence
on the eventual federal Bill of Rights. See discussion infra notes 67–69 and accompanying text.
7. Twelve Amendments were actually submitted to the states for ratification. LABUNSKI,
supra note 3, at 240. For a discussion of the congressional debate of the proposed amendments,
see generally id. at 213–40. While most accept that the first ten Amendments comprise the Bill
of Rights, others consider it to be only the first eight. Robert N. Wilentz, Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States, The New Constitution, Address at Princeton University (Jan.
15, 1985), in 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 887, 890 (1997).
8. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 597 (1992); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678
(1984).
9. See, e.g., McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005) (concluding that
displays of the Ten Commandments in several county courthouses in Kentucky was a violation of
the First Amendment); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005) (companion case to
McCreary County, ruling that a Ten Commandments display at a courthouse in Texas was not
unconstitutional); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 643–46 (2002) (holding that an Ohio
voucher program which allowed parents to receive government funds to pay any private school
tuition, even parochial school tuition, did not violate the Establishment Clause); Lee, 505 U.S. at
599 (finding that clergy-led prayer at an official school graduation ceremony was
unconstitutional); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (holding that the erection of the annual Christmas
nativity display in a public park did not violate the Establishment Clause).
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At the state level, the Kentucky Supreme Court recently held in University
of the Cumberlands v. Pennybacker10 that the Baptist university’s receipt of
state funds for construction of a new pharmacy school violated the Kentucky
Constitution.11 On the national stage, all eyes have been on the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), better known as the
“Stimulus Package” or “Bailout Bill,” which was passed in February 2009.12
Among a laundry list of new spending, ARRA allows use of federal funds for
certain projects at RACs.13 Though it defers to state law in the use of these
funds, states can vary widely in their mandate of separation of church and
state, creating additional concern that these universities and their students are
not receiving equal treatment across the country.14
Part I of this note discusses Supreme Court opinions that have shaped
modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence—from the Court’s attempt to
recapture the framer’s intent, to the troubled state of the current test. This
section also discusses how the Supreme Court has applied Establishment
Clause principles to federal funding of RACs and some of the issues
surrounding ARRA. Part II then discusses differences between federal and
state constitutional provisions, and how states have adjudicated RAC funding
challenges arising under state law. Part III provides an in-depth case study of
two recent state constitutional cases involving the funding of RACs. The two
cases featured in this section arose under similar state constitutional provisions,
but resulted in dramatically different results by the respective state supreme
courts. Finally, Part IV discusses ongoing federal constitutional issues arising
out of such unpredictable state adjudication, including failed attempts to strike
down these provisions. Part IV also proposes how to better equalize the
outcomes of adjudication among the states.

10. Univ. of Cumberlands v. Pennybacker, 308 S.W.3d 668, 671 (Ky. 2010), aff’g
Pennybacker v. Beshear, No. 06-CI-00554, 2008 WL 644848, at *1 (Franklin Cir. Ct. Mar. 6,
2008). The original case was named for Rev. Albert M. Pennybacker and the current governor of
Kentucky. Pennybacker, 2008 WL 644848, at *1. The University of the Cumberlands was an
intervening defendant in the original action but was the one to appeal the adverse summary
judgment ruling of the district court. Univ. of Cumberlands, 308 S.W.3d at 672.
11. Univ. of Cumberlands, 308 S.W.3d at 679.
12. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115
(2009) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
13. See, e.g., id. § 14001, 123 Stat. at 279 (instructing governors to refrain from considering
the type or mission of an institution of higher education).
14. See infra Part I.C.
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE
A.

Attempting to Capture the Founder’s Intent

Though one would hardly dispute that Supreme Court decisions regarding
separation of church and state have been anything but consistent, the Court has
tried to act with an eye toward history, attempting to channel the intentions of
our founding fathers.15 In Everson v. Board of Education,16 the Court
reiterated the meaning of the Establishment Clause:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away
from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious
beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to
teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can,
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or
17
groups and vice versa.

In addition, the Court quoted Thomas Jefferson’s statement that the
Establishment Clause was meant to create “a wall of separation between
church and State.”18
This 1947 Everson opinion reestablished a clear picture of the goal of the
Establishment Clause, but provided no uniform, coherent way to test whether a
particular government action violated the First Amendment.19 Finally, in 1971,
the Court put forth a test of constitutionality in Lemon v. Kurtzman.20 The
Lemon test states: 1) A statute must have a secular purpose; 2) The primary
effect of the statute can neither advance nor inhibit religion; and 3) A statute
cannot support “excessive government entanglement with religion.”21 The test

15. Cord & Ball, supra note 3, at 896.
16. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
17. Id. at 15–16.
18. Id. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)). It is from this
phrase that we get the common reference to “separation of church and state.” Id. The quoted
phrase has been traced back to an 1802 reply letter from Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist
Association commenting on the First Amendment. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164. See also Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptists (Jan. 1, 1802), available at http://www.loc.gov/
loc/lcib/9806/danpre.html.
19. Marcia S. Alembik, Note, The Future of the Lemon Test: A Sweeter Alternative for
Establishment Clause Analysis, 40 GA. L. REV. 1171, 1177 (2006).
20. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971); Alembik, supra note 19, at 1177–78.
21. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13 (emphasis added).
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may seem simple enough, but in the forty years since the Lemon test was
announced, it has been criticized, modified, and sometimes even ignored by
the Court.22
One notable attempt to modify the Lemon test was Justice O’Connor’s
concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, which proposed a clarification of the
purpose prong to make the test more applicable.23 Justice O’Connor believed
the proper question was whether the intent of the questioned government
action was to “convey a message of endorsement or disapproval” of any
particular religion.24 The following year, in Wallace v. Jaffree, Justice
O’Connor again expressed concerns over the applicability of the Lemon test.25
Offering a further refinement of Lemon, Justice O’Connor suggested the
analysis should focus on “whether an objective observer, acquainted with the
text, legislative history, and implementation” of the state action, would
consider it an endorsement of religion.26 Despite these repeated attempts to
clarify and refine the Lemon test, it continues to have a shaky reputation with
the Court.27
But not all believed modification was the answer; some felt that Lemon
simply did not work in certain circumstances.28 In a mark of departure, the
Court in Marsh v. Chambers avoided applying Lemon to the Nebraska state
legislature’s practice of opening sessions with a prayer by introducing the
alternative historical analysis/practice test.29 In finding that the tradition did
not violate the Establishment Clause, the Court stated historical patterns alone
could not justify constitutional violations, but found the contested practice had
“become part of the fabric of our society,” thus making it a “tolerable
acknowledgement” of widely held beliefs.30 This was not the only alternative
test developed by the Court. In Lee v. Weisman, the Court applied the coercion
test to invalidate the giving of a prayer at a public school graduation.31 The

22. Alembik, supra note 19, at 1173–74.
23. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687, 691 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 691. This clarification by Justice O’Connor came to be known as the
“endorsement test” and was widely adopted by the courts. Alembik, supra note 19, at 1181–82.
Courts continue to apply the endorsement test when analyzing the validity of government action
under Lemon. Id.
25. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 68–69 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 76. Ten years later, Justice O’Connor further elaborated on the “objective
observer” principle stating that it was like the “reasonable person” from tort law in that it was not
an actual individual but a “personification of a community ideal.” Capitol Square Review &
Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779–80 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
27. See Alembik, supra note 19, at 1184–85.
28. See id. at 1189 (noting Justice Rehnquist found the Lemon test was “not useful” in
dealing with the constitutionality of a religious monument erected in Texas).
29. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786–88 (1983).
30. Id. at 790, 792.
31. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
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Court held that the peer pressure to stand or remain silent during the prayer had
the effect of coercing students to participate in religion, thus violating the
Establishment Clause.32
Despite the mixed reviews and departures, the Court has never officially
overruled Lemon. Perhaps Justice Scalia said it best: “The secret of the Lemon
test’s survival, I think, is that it is so easy to kill. It is there to scare us (and our
audience) when we wish it to do so, but we can command it to return to the
tomb at will.”33 Some scholars suggest that the use of alternative tests and the
general acceptance of Justice O’Connor’s “endorsement test” indicate that the
Court is becoming more tolerant of overlap between government and
religion.34 One place this increasing tolerance appears is in the funding of
RACs.
B.

Funding of RACs Under the Establishment Clause and Lemon

Despite the seemingly strict construction of the language of the 1947
Everson opinion,35 some believe Justice Black actually laid the groundwork for
a “neutrality” principle which could allow such government funding if done on
an equal basis.36 In the years since Everson, this neutrality principle has taken
one of three forms: 1) the ability to separate secular and sectarian functions of
the RAC; 2) individual free choice of which school to attend where the funds
pass to an RAC by way of individual tuition dollars; or 3) diversity of those
benefitting from the aid.37 The method that comes under the heaviest criticism,
of course, is the first, where funds can pass directly to a RAC in what would
seem to be an apparent violation of the Establishment Clause.
In the early 1970s, the Supreme Court approved certain direct government
funding for RACs, opening a door in the wall of separation between church

32. Id. at 598.
33. Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 399 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring). This statement by Justice Scalia could not have been truer than in June
2005, when the Court handed down two seemingly conflicting opinions on the constitutionality of
Ten Commandments monuments on public property on the same day. Compare Van Orden v.
Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681, 682, 692 (2005) (plurality opinion) (holding that a display of the Ten
Commandments which stood on the capitol grounds unopposed for nearly forty years did not
violate the Establishment Clause), with McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 855–56,
881 (2005) (concluding that a planned Ten Commandments monument on the courthouse grounds
as part of a larger “Foundations of American Law and Government Display” did violate the
Establishment Clause).
34. Alembik, supra note 19, at 1184.
35. See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text.
36. D. Michael Murray, Note, Rosenberger v. Rector & Board of Visitors of the University
of Virginia: A Battle Between Establishment Clause Principles and First Amendment Clauses
Further Weakens the Wall of Separation, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 569, 571–72 (1997).
37. Id. at 577.
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and state.38 In Tilton v. Richardson, the Court considered government funding
of a RAC under the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963.39 Interestingly,
this case was decided the same day as Lemon and applied the same principles,
but unlike Lemon, the Court concluded that such funding was constitutional.40
Lemon and Tilton were similar in issue: Lemon concerned government funding
of a parochial secondary school, and Tilton involved funding for construction
at a RAC.41 The Tilton Court felt that funding a college or university posed a
much smaller danger because children at that age are far less impressionable.42
The Court also based its decision on the fact that the proposed facilities
themselves were religiously neutral and that the university was committed to
Furthermore, the funding would be a one-time
academic freedom.43
government grant rather than recurring financing, thus eliminating the need for
continued government intervention or entanglement to ensure compliance.44
This is in stark contrast to the major concern over the proposed funding in
Lemon—funding of teachers’ salaries at parochial primary and secondary
schools—which the Court believed would require unfeasible government

38. See Marjorie Reiley Maguire, Comment, Having One’s Cake and Eating it Too:
Government Funding and Religious Exemptions for Religiously Affiliated Colleges and
Universities, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 1061, 1063 (1989); see also Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426
U.S. 736, 744, 766–67 (1976) (finding that annual funding to four Catholic colleges was not
unconstitutional because the colleges were largely committed to academic freedom like public
universities); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 738, 749 (1973) (concluding that issuing revenue
bonds to a religious university under South Carolina statute for purposes of construction and
repair of certain campus facilities was constitutional); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 674–
77, 689 (1971) (holding that religiously affiliated universities were eligible for federal funding
like other institutions of higher learning and that such funding did not violate the Establishment
Clause). Having opened this door, in 1975, government funding of RACs reached a half billion
dollars. Maguire, supra, at 1066 n.21 (citing PAUL J. WEBER & DENNIS A. GILBERT, PRIVATE
CHURCHES AND PUBLIC MONEY: CHURCH-GOVERNMENT FISCAL RELATIONS 101 (1981)).
39. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 674–75.
40. Maguire, supra note 38, at 1069; Tilton, 403 U.S. at 678, 689.
41. Maguire, supra note 38, at 1068–69.
42. See Tilton, 403 U.S. at 687–88. In addition to the higher level of maturity of college
students, college attendance is also voluntary, which some also consider a basis for the dual
constitutional treatment of funding primary and secondary schools versus colleges and
universities. F. King Alexander, The Decline and Fall of the Wall of Separation Between Church
and State and Its Consequences for the Funding of Public and Private Institutions of Higher
Education, 10 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 114 (1998).
43. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 681 (finding that the facilities funded at the four institutions in
question included two libraries, a language laboratory, a science building, and an arts and theater
building and that there was no evidence that any religious indoctrination had “seep[ed]” into these
facilities).
44. Id. at 687–88.
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monitoring to ensure public money was not used to teach non-secular
subjects.45
Within five years, the Supreme Court upheld state funding of RACs in two
additional cases, Hunt v. McNair46 and Roemer v. Board of Public Works.47
The issue in Hunt was very similar to that in Tilton, and the Court essentially
affirmed its previous ruling, upholding a state grant of revenue bonds to fund
construction of secular facilities at a Baptist university.48 By contrast, the issue
in Roemer involved a general (rather than “for construction”), annual (rather
than one-time) grant of state funds.49 Under the challenged state statute, funds
could not “be utilized by the institutions for sectarian purposes.”50 To help
ensure compliance with the statute, all institutions receiving public money
were required to submit an annual report identifying the subsidized
expenditures.51 In holding the funding constitutional, the Court determined the
universities were not “pervasively sectarian,” meaning a secular purpose was
distinguishable from their religious affiliation.52 This determination was based
largely upon evidence of academic freedom and a high degree of autonomy
from the Catholic Church, despite the university holding religious exercises on
campus and mandating theology courses.53 Addressing the seemingly
troublesome reporting requirement, the Court held it was not “excessive
entanglement” because audits would be “quick and nonjudgmental,” due to the
ease of separation between secular and sectarian activities.54
In short, the Court seems permissive of neutral government funding of
RACs. So long as funding is designated for a secular facility or project and the
45. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 621–22 (1971). Thus, the stumbling block for
the proposed funding in Lemon was the entanglement prong of the three prong test articulated by
the Court. Maguire, supra note 38, at 1069.
46. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
47. Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
48. Compare Hunt, 413 U.S. at 743–46, with Tilton, 403 U.S. 672.
49. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 736.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 755, 758.
53. Id. at 755–56. The Court found that the religious exercises were an optional spiritual
development opportunity for students and were viewed as a secondary objective of the
institution—secondary to academic achievement. Id. At the same time, while theology courses
were a required part of the students’ academic curriculum, the Court regarded them as part of a
well rounded liberal arts education. Id.
54. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 763–64. At first glance, the decision in Roemer seems to conflict
with Lemon, where the Court struck down the reimbursement of parochial school teachers’
salaries for fear that the ongoing monitoring would constitute excessive entanglement. The real
reason for the different outcomes likely stems from the fact that the Court did not believe that a
religious elementary or secondary school could have a dominant purpose that was secular,
whereas the idea of academic freedom tends to dominate at an institution of higher learning. See
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 685–86 (1971).
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institution has a separate and distinct purpose apart from its religious
affiliation, the Court will likely uphold the funding. Congress also seems to
embrace some degree of neutral funding of RACs, as evidenced most recently
by ARRA—the 2009 stimulus package. The issues and debate surrounding
this new legislation are discussed in the next section.
C. Current Issues Surrounding Government Funding of RACs
When ARRA was signed into law in February 2009, there was already
much controversy over spending tax dollars to try to stimulate the national
economy. But adding to that controversy was a new spending provision for
“modernization, renovation, or repair” of public schools and institutions of
higher learning.55 The Act states “A Governor shall not consider the type or
mission of an institution of higher education, and shall consider any institution
for funding . . . .”56 While the state must consider “religious” and public
universities equally, the law makes it clear that funds may not be used to
renovate or repair facilities “used for sectarian instruction or religious
worship” or where “a substantial portion of the functions . . . are subsumed in a
religious mission.”57 Neither may funds be used for improvements to athletic
or administrative facilities, general maintenance costs, or the purchase of
vehicles.58 Thus, ARRA once again opens the door for federal funding of
RACs, so long as the money goes to secular educational instruction.
Despite the apparent contradiction of separation of church and state, the
Act has sparked debates of being too restrictive. Former Arkansas governor
Mike Huckabee and Senator Jim DeMint have called the stimulus package
“anti-religious.”59 Their concern was that the restrictions would prohibit all
religious activity in a federally-funded building, which could affect student
groups’ ability to hold meetings in those facilities.60 DeMint proposed an
amendment to the stimulus bill that would have removed the limitations on
how RACs could utilize the federal funds.61 Ironically, if DeMint’s
amendment had passed, eliminating the covenants restricting the use of the
funds, the Act would most certainly have been unconstitutional—amounting to
an unequivocal endorsement of religion in violation of the First Amendment.62
Rather, as the language of the Act stands, intermittent religious student activity
55. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 14002(b)(1),
123 Stat. 115, 280 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
56. Id. § 14002(b)(2), 123 Stat. at 281 (emphasis added).
57. Id. § 14004(c)(3), 123 Stat. at 281–82.
58. Id. § 14003(b), 123 Stat. at 281.
59. Tobin Grant, Is the Stimulus Act Anti-Religious?, CHRISTIANITY TODAY (Feb. 18, 2009,
1:23 PM), http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2009/februaryweb-only/107-31.0.html.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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at institutions that receive the funding will not be affected so long as the main
purpose of the building or facility is secular in nature.63
On the flipside, others believe that the spending provision is too
permissive. To quell those fears, the Act provides one final caveat: “Nothing
in this section shall allow a local educational agency to engage in school
modernization, renovation, or repair that is inconsistent with State law.”64 This
deference to state law can have a huge impact on the ability of a RAC to
receive funding, because state constitutions and statutes can be far more
restrictive than their federal counterparts. One example of such heightened
restrictions is Section 189 of the Kentucky Constitution, the provision under
which University of the Cumberlands was decided,65 which states, “[n]o
portion of any fund or tax . . . levied for educational purposes, shall be
apportioned to, or used by, or in aid of, any church, sectarian or
denominational school.”66 The following section further explores these
differences between federal and state guarantees of religious freedom.
II. A SURGE IN STATE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
A.

Origin and Amendment of State Constitutional Guarantees of Religious
Freedom

Some of the guaranteed personal freedoms that Americans know and enjoy
today actually predate the federal Bill of Rights, as several colonies drafted
similar individual protections into their original charters.67 These protections
began to take the shape of a more formal “Bill of Rights” around the start of
the American Revolution when the colonial governments were strongly
encouraged to begin drafting their own “state” constitutions.68 The Virginia

63. For a discussion of the circumstances under which federal courts will generally uphold
government funding for constructing facilities at RACs, see supra Part I.B. Occasional use by
student organizations wishing to conduct religious services and other religious activities does not
make the primary function of the facility religious. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 273–75
(1981). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that once a building is constructed and made
generally available for use by the public and student groups, it is unconstitutional for the
university to deny access to religious student organizations. Id. at 277. Thus, concerns about
student groups being turned away from such federally-funded buildings are without merit.
64. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 14002(c), 123
Stat. 115, 281 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (emphasis added).
65. For a full discussion of this provision and the Kentucky courts’ interpretation of it, see
infra Part III.B.
66. KY. CONST. § 189.
67. See Pearson, supra note 5, at 48–49. Several colonial charters included guarantees of
religious freedom as early as the late-1600s. Id. at 48.
68. Id. at 49. Some states chose to enumerate individual rights in a separate document,
similar to the subsequent federal Bill of Rights, while other states incorporated them directly into
the text of the constitution. Id. However, not all of the original thirteen states had formally
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Declaration of Rights was the first to be drafted and was one of the most
instrumental, heavily influencing several sister states as well as the federal Bill
of Rights.69
Even from the start, however, each state’s bill of rights varied in
specificity.70 For example, the first Virginia Declaration of Rights, speaking
on the right of religious freedom, simply stated “all men are equally entitled to
the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience . . . .”71
The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was modeled after Virginia’s, but
included more detail,72 declaring “no man ought, or of right can be compelled
to attend any religious worship, or erect or support any place of worship, or
maintain any ministry, contrary to, or against his own free will and
consent . . . .”73 Many state constitutions have been amended multiple times
since their enactment, and several now include significant detail concerning
government entanglement with religion.74
An important round of amendments came in the mid-1800s amid debate
over taxation of private colleges and universities.75 This, coupled with strong
anti-immigrant and anti-Catholic sentiment, prompted states to add more
restrictive provisions to their constitutions.76 These amendments, generally
called the Blaine Amendments, prohibit state legislatures from giving any
financial aid or support to “sectarian” schools.77 Immediately following the
adoption of these provisions it was much more difficult for RACs to obtain
public funding.78 For nearly a century, state courts sent an unwavering
message—all funding of RACs was prohibited, whether in the form of direct

adopted a Bill of Rights by the time of the American Revolution, or even by the adoption of the
Constitution. See Wilentz, supra note 7, at 890.
69. Pearson, supra note 5, at 49–50.
70. See id. at 50–53.
71. VA. CONST. of 1776, chap. I, § 16 (1776).
72. Pearson, supra note 5, at 51–52.
73. PA. CONST. of 1776, chap. I , § 2 (1776).
74. See Pearson, supra note 5, at 62.
75. Alexander, supra note 42, at 111.
76. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Reconstructing the Blaine Amendments, 2 FIRST AMENDMENT
L. REV. 85, 86 (2003).
77. Id. at 85. See also Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine
Amendments: Origins, Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 551,
554–55 (2003). The Amendments are named for Representative James Blaine who proposed a
similar amendment for the federal constitution but was unable to secure enough votes in Congress
for its adoption. Id. at 556, 573. Today thirty-seven states still have such amendments in place.
Gedicks, supra note 76, at 85. However, many have questioned the discriminatory nature of
these amendments, and in recent years, courts have increasingly questioned their constitutionality.
DeForrest, supra, at 606–07.
78. Alexander, supra note 42, at 111–12.
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funding or indirect assistance through scholarships, grants, and vouchers.79
When Congress and the Supreme Court began to take a more liberal view of
funding RACs in the mid-twentieth century, state courts saw a change as
well.80
A.

State Adjudication of Challenges to Funding RACs

In 1963, Congress passed the Higher Education Facilities Act,81 followed
by the Higher Education Act of 196582 which, like ARRA, provided funding
for construction of “academic facilities” at institutions of higher education
without distinguishing between public, private, and religious universities.83
This led to several federal cases challenging such government funding,
followed by the controversial Supreme Court decisions finding the practice
constitutional.84 The federal courts, however, were not the only ones
adjudicating challenges of constitutionality. State courts also saw an increase
in the number of cases challenging funding of RACs with litigants asserting a
violation of state constitutional rights.85
Some attribute this rise to the fact people were unhappy with the liberal
decisions coming from the federal courts on the granting of government money
to RACs.86 It was becoming increasingly harder to overcome the mounting
federal precedent tending to allow funding when it was allocated to academic
facilities with little or no religious intertwining.87 But when a state provision
was also implicated, the state court could strike down the disfavored spending
by finding that it did not violate the federal Establishment Clause, but that it
did violate the more prohibitive state constitutional provision.88 Furthermore,
under Michigan v. Long, by adjudicating the issue on “adequate and

79. Id. at 112–13.
80. Id. at 113–14.
81. Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-204, § 106, 77 Stat. 363, 368
(1963) (codified in 20 U.S.C. § 1011 (1970)).
82. Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, § 111, 79 Stat. 1219, 1224 (1965)
(codified in 20 U.S.C. § 716 (1964)).
83. Alexander, supra note 42, at 115.
84. See supra Part I.B.
85. This was part of the New Judicial Federalism movement. Jennifer DiGiovanni, Justice
Charles M. Leibson and the Revival of State Constitutional Law: A Microcosm of a Movement, 86
KY. L.J. 1009, 1014 (1998).
86. See Wilentz, supra note 7, at 893.
87. See supra Part I.B.
88. See Wilentz, supra note 7, at 892. Under such a practice the state court would adjudicate
the issue on an “adequate and independent state ground.” DiGiovanni, supra note 85, at 1016.
This practice was heavily criticized, however, due to the Supreme Court’s jurisdictional inability
to review a state supreme court decision decided on independent grounds. Id. Some believe that
this practice allowed what was truly a federal question to be wrongly decided. Id.
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independent state grounds,” the ruling was not subject to review by the
Supreme Court.89
But bringing the action before a state court also provided an opportunity
for a new viewpoint into whether an institution was wholly “religious” in
nature. One of the leading cases of the time, Horace Mann League v. Board of
Public Works,90 was influential more for the way the decision was reached
rather than for the decision itself. In Horace Mann League, the Maryland
Court of Appeals considered the constitutionality of a matching grant—a type
of direct funding—to four religious colleges under both federal and state law.91
The court ultimately concluded that funding to three of the schools violated the
First Amendment due to the sectarian nature of the institutions.92 But in
reaching this decision, the court looked at six different criteria: 1) the stated
purpose of the college; 2) the religious control of the governing board; 3) the
extent of financial assistance from and, affiliation with, religious organizations;
4) the prominence of religion at the school—including in the curriculum, the
architecture, and sponsorship of religious activities; 5) the accreditation of the
program and activities of alumni; and 6) the work and image of the college
within the community.93
The criteria used in Horace Mann League continue to play a role in
challenges to RAC funding even today. Several states with more restrictive
constitutional provisions must determine whether the institution receiving the
challenged funding is indeed “religious.”94 As seen in the case studies below,
some of these state courts look to similar criteria as those used by the
Maryland Court to determine the true nature of these schools.95 But, as is also
evident from the case studies, not every state approaches challenges to RAC
funding in the same way, thus raising concerns of Equal Protection.96

89. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983). Where the state issues were interwoven
with federal law, a state had to make it clear that any federal precedent used in the course of the
decision was merely for guidance and did not compel the court to reach the conclusion that it did.
Only then would the Supreme Court find the state grounds to be “adequate and independent,” and
thus not subject to its appellate review. Id. at 1040–41.
90. Horace Mann League v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 220 A.2d 51 (Md. 1966).
91. Id. at 53.
92. Id. at 67–69, 73.
93. Id. at 65–66.
94. See, e.g., id. at 60.
95. See infra notes 126–32 and accompanying text.
96. Equal Protection, of course, refers to the provision “[n]o state shall . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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III. CASE STUDIES: RECENT STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CASES ON FUNDING
RACS
A.

Case Study: Saint Louis University v. Masonic Temple Association of St.
Louis
1.

Facts, Arguments, and Court Findings

In 2007, the Missouri Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of
using public funding for construction of a new arena at Saint Louis University,
a Jesuit Catholic university.97 The university was granted $8 million dollars in
tax increment financing (TIF)98 by the City of St. Louis toward construction of
a 13,000-seat arena for sporting events, graduations, and various other secular
purposes.99 The arena was also part of a larger city-wide redevelopment
project for blighted areas.100 The city had passed an ordinance to establish the
necessary TIF assistance for the arena and other redevelopment projects that
were secular in nature, including theaters, parking areas, housing, and
educational facilities.101
The Masonic Temple Association of St. Louis (Masons) objected to the
funding, arguing that it violated the Missouri Establishment Clause because the
university was controlled by a religious creed.102 The Missouri Constitution is
more restrictive than others on the guarantee of religious freedom, stating “no
preference shall be given to . . . any church, sect or creed of religion, or any
form of religious faith or worship,” with “preference” stated to include public
funding.103 More specifically, with respect to education, the Missouri
Constitution mandates that no government municipality “shall ever make an
appropriation . . . to help to support or sustain any private or public school,
academy, seminary, college, university, or other institution of learning

97. Saint Louis Univ. v. Masonic Temple Ass’n of St. Louis, 220 S.W.3d 721, 721 (Mo.
2007).
98. The way such tax increment financing works is that for each year following the planned
project, the taxpayer will make payments instead of paying taxes on the increased valuation of the
property. See Tax Increment Fin. Comm’n v. J.E. Dunn Constr. Co., 781 S.W.2d 70, 73 (Mo.
1989). The amount of the payment is equal to what would have been collected in tax revenue on
the increase in assessed value due to the redevelopment project. Id. Payments are then placed in
a special fund and used as security for the bonds that were issued by the city to fund the project.
Id.
99. Saint Louis Univ., 220 S.W.3d at 724.
100. Id. at 724–25. The city’s redevelopment plan stated that the redevelopment area was the
cultural theater and artistic center for the city, an area which also included SLU. SAINT LOUIS,
MO., CITY ORDINANCES, Introduction to ORDINANCE 65703 (2002–2003). The plan also stated
that SLU continued to “serve as an invaluable educational and cultural entities [sic].” Id.
101. SAINT LOUIS, MO., CITY ORDINANCES, at Exhibit IV.
102. Saint Louis Univ., 220 S.W.3d at 726.
103. MO. CONST. art. I, § 7.
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controlled by any religious creed.”104 Therefore, to determine whether there
was a constitutional violation, the court needed to look at the history and
mission of the university.
Saint Louis University (SLU) evolved from the St. Louis Academy,
founded by the Jesuits in 1818.105 Today, the university is run by a president
who has general control over the management and direction of the business
and educational affairs of the university.106 Per the university bylaws, the
president serves as a single member of the Board of Trustees, which controls
operations of the university by majority vote.107 The bylaws also require that
the Board be composed of 25 to 55 members, where not less than 6 but not
more than 12 must be Jesuits.108 The remaining trustees, SLU faculty, and
student body include non-Catholics and persons with no religious affiliation at
all.109 The university tradition, however, admittedly tends to follow Jesuit
philosophies and ideals.110
It is this Jesuit tradition which formed the heart of the dispute.111 The
Masons argued that a governing board could be independent and still be
controlled by a religious creed, if required to operate under a set of laws
founded on religion, which the Masons believed was the case with SLU.112
According to the Masons, the school’s own mission statement promoted “the
pursuit of truth for the greater glory of God” and dedication to a “continuing
quest for understanding of God’s creation . . . and integration of the values,
knowledge and skills required to transform Society in the spirit of the
Gospels.”113
The American Civil Liberties Union of Eastern Missouri (ACLU) filed an
amicus brief which further bolstered the Mason’s argument that SLU was
governed by a religious creed, drawing attention to the university’s official
website.114 The ACLU noted that the website advertised a “Jesuit Education
Since 1818” on each page and, at the time, featured a picture of the current
104. Id. § 8.
105. Saint Louis Univ., 220 S.W.3d at 724.
106. Id. At the time the case was being decided, the current president of the university was in
fact a Jesuit priest, but following recent amendments to the university bylaws, it is no longer
required that the president be a member of the Jesuit order. Id. at 724 n.3.
107. Id. at 724.
108. Id. At the time of this suit, 9 out of a total of 42 trustees were Jesuits. Id.
109. Id. At the time of this suit, fewer than one-half of the student body considered
themselves Catholics. Id.
110. Saint Louis Univ., 220 S.W.3d at 724.
111. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 24–25, Saint Louis Univ., 220 S.W.3d 721 (No.
SC88075).
112. Id. at 29.
113. Id.
114. Brief for ACLU of E. Mo. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 14, Saint Louis
Univ., 220 S.W.3d 721 (No. SC88075).
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Jesuit president dressed in clerical clothing.115 It also highlighted a quote from
a SLU professor that said, “SLU is a great place to grow personally as well as
spiritually . . . .”116 In addition, the ACLU argued that the Student Life section
listed Sunday mass as the Catholic students’ “primary celebration of our
eucharistic community” and also named multiple other programs where
students and faculty could further their faith and spirituality.117 The ACLU
also argued that students themselves were under the impression that they were
attending a Catholic university.118
Responding to the attack on its mission, SLU acknowledged that in honor
of tradition it intended to be “identified,” “motivated,” and “guided” by
Catholic and spiritual ideals, but that it was not “controlled by” these
purposes.119 Rather, SLU argued that the purposes of the university, as set
forth in the charter, were “the encouragement of learning and the extension of
the means of education.”120 Furthermore, SLU declared it was committed to
serving the community, the nation, and the world through teaching, research,
and communication of knowledge, much like many other American
universities.121 This commitment to service and academics, SLU argued, was a
clear indicator that the university was not controlled by a religious creed.122
SLU further argued that these values were a “philosophy of education and a
system of character formation” designed to teach students to take lessons from
the classroom and reach out to the community, thus helping students to become
responsible, contributing members of society.123
The district court agreed with SLU and granted summary judgment in
favor of the university.124 The Masons appealed to the Missouri Court of
Appeals, but due to the important nature and general public interest of the
issue, it was transferred to the Missouri Supreme Court before a ruling was
issued.125 Following the transfer, the Missouri Supreme Court determined the

115. Id.
116. Id. at 15.
117. Id. at 15, 16.
118. Id. at 16. To support this argument, the ACLU cited student debate and opposition over
adding a socialist-leaning student organization on the ground that the views and principles of
socialism went against the Catholic Church. Id. at 16–17.
119. Substitute Brief of Respondent Saint Louis Univ. at 50, Saint Louis Univ., 220 S.W.3d
721 (No. SC88075) (emphasis added).
120. Id. at 48.
121. Id. at 48–49.
122. Id. at 49.
123. Id. at 51.
124. Saint Louis Univ., 220 S.W.3d at 725.
125. Id. The Missouri Constitution grants jurisdiction for order of transfer to the Supreme
Court when a majority of the court of appeals justices believe the question is of general interest or
importance. MO. CONST. art. V, § 10. Such order for transfer may be made either before or after
the appellate court has issued an opinion in the case. Id.
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key question was not whether the university has any affiliation with religion,
but whether that religious component “pervades the atmosphere” to give the
effect of religious control.126 While operation under a religious creed tends to
indicate the religious affiliation is controlling, mere tradition and aspiration to
follow the ideals of a given religion or sect are not proof of control by a
religious creed—“appreciation for” and “control by” are two different
things.127
Speaking more specifically on the issue of control, the court found it of
great importance that the university operated under an independent and
religiously diverse Board of Trustees.128 Although the university bylaws stated
SLU will be publicly identified as a Catholic and Jesuit university and will be
motivated by the moral values of the Judeo-Christian tradition, the court held
this was insufficient to show control by a religious creed.129 Similarly, there
was no indication that these aspirations dominated campus life or restricted
academic freedom, including research and inquiry into matters contrary to
traditional Catholic teachings.130 The court further noted that the purpose of
the proposed arena was to provide a venue for secular student and community
events while improving a deteriorated and blighted area of the city.131 Thus,
the court held the ordinance allocating TIF funding for construction of the
arena was constitutional.132

126. Saint Louis Univ., 220 S.W.3d at 726.
127. Id. at 727.
128. Id. The Missouri Supreme Court had previously held that the existence of an
independent board of directors is a strong indicator that a university is not “controlled” by
religion. See Ams. United v. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d 711, 721 (Mo. 1976).
129. Saint Louis Univ., 220 S.W.3d at 727–28.
130. Id. at 728.
131. Id.
132. Id. Interestingly, the Missouri Court of Appeals reached largely the same conclusion
based on the arguments presented to it prior to the transfer to the Missouri Supreme Court. In the
opinion, the court stated that to interpret “control” to mean any kind of religious affiliation would
unduly expand the reach of the prohibition in Article IX, Section 8 of the Missouri Constitution.
Saint Louis Univ. v. Masonic Temple Ass’n of St. Louis, No. ED 86804, 2006 WL 2805606, at
*4 (Mo. Ct. App., Oct. 3, 2006). Instead, the court said the provision must be read to exclude
government aid only when the affiliated religion is advanced though operation of the school. Id.
The court of appeals also looked at the purpose of the proposed building—a sports arena—and
noted that such a building was for a secular rather than religious purpose. Id. Following the
Missouri Supreme Court’s decision, SLU’s Chaifetz Arena was completed in April 2008,
providing a midsize multipurpose venue within St. Louis City limits, a venue size previously
unavailable in the downtown area. Kevin C. Johnson, On the Scene, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
(GET OUT), Jan. 31, 2008, at 15.
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Analysis of the Court’s Decision

The fact the arena was intended to benefit the community as a whole was
perhaps underemphasized by the court. Indeed, only about half of the
bookings at the arena are directly linked to SLU, with many of these events
being men’s and women’s basketball games.133 Arguably it would have been
easy to adjudicate this issue on the fact that the project belonged to the
community rather than the university. But instead, the court took on the
tougher question of what constitutes a “religious” university.
To answer this question, the court focused almost exclusively on the
university’s mission and religious control of university governance—two of
the same factors considered by the court in Horace Mann League.134 The
Missouri Supreme Court ultimately found that evidence of academic freedom
in research and the independence of the governing board provided sufficient
separation from the Church.135 Such findings are also in line with the Supreme
Court’s findings in Tilton and Roemer, where academic freedom and
independence from the Church weighed heavily in the decisions that funding
RACs was constitutional.136
Interestingly, another Horace Mann League factor—image—was
addressed by the ACLU in their amicus brief, where they claimed SLU’s
website promoted a Catholic school,137 but was not discussed by the Missouri
Supreme Court.138 The power of a website in modern society to promote an
organization’s image and influence public opinion is undeniable, as many
people today turn to the Internet first when looking for information on a
business or organization. However, the ACLU’s argument seems to fall short
after looking at the current university website. Visitors are greeted by a banner
of pictures featuring a variety of current events and by important information
pertaining to the university and the community.139 Items appearing on the
banner in the past have included choosing a major, new programs available at
SLU, Billiken (SLU’s mascot) sports, study abroad opportunities, best places
to hang out in St. Louis, and spiritual growth.140 Information on “spirituality,”

133. Johnson, supra note 132.
134. In fact, these were the first two factors named by the court in Horace Mann League. See
supra note 93 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 128–30 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 42, 52–53 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text.
138. See Saint Louis Univ. v. Masonic Temple Ass’n of St. Louis, 220 S.W.3d 721, 726–28
(Mo. 2007) (analyzing any potential violation of the Missouri Establishment Clause by looking
only at the Mason’s arguments of control by religious creed through SLU’s Jesuit affiliation and
governance structure.).
139. SAINT LOUIS UNIV., http://www.slu.edu/index.xml (last visited Nov. 14, 2010).
140. Id. The website is updated periodically to reflect the news, events, and information most
current or pertinent for the time of year or what is happening in current events, so not all items
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the “Jesuit tradition,” and “campus ministry” is displayed no more prominently
than any other information to be conveyed to prospective students or
parents.141 Arguably, the appearance of such information is irrelevant to the
question of religious control, since the website of nearly every university in
America, including public universities, contains information on different
religious organizations and opportunities to attend religious services.142
Taking into account all the factors—the mission of the university, the
practice of academic freedom in all scholastic fields, the independence of the
governing board, and the religious diversity among students and faculty—the
court reached the proper decision in this case. But even more importantly,
looking at the larger picture, the Missouri Supreme Court based its decision on
much the same factual analysis found in other similar state and federal funding
cases. The establishment of this precedent helps alleviate concerns of
inequality when adjudicating RAC funding challenges under Missouri
constitutional law.143
B.

Case Study: University of the Cumberlands v. Pennybacker
1.

Facts, Arguments, and Court Findings

In 2010, the Kentucky Supreme Court decided the constitutionality of
using public funding to construct a new pharmacy school at University of the
Cumberlands (UC).144 UC, formerly called Cumberland College, is a small
private school that was founded by Baptists in 1887.145 The college is located
in Williamsburg, Kentucky, the heart of Appalachia, and has historically
served students from this rural mountain region.146 The university specializes

appear in the banner at all times. For instance, during the World Cup, the banner included a
feature on SLU soccer with a Q&A with SLU’s soccer coach. Those items not featured in the
banner are generally still available via other links on the website. Id.
141. A link to information on the Jesuit tradition is found under the section for prospective
students under “About SLU.” About SLU, SAINT LOUIS UNIV., http://www.slu.edu/x5029.xml
(last visited Nov. 14, 2010). The information on spiritual opportunities appears under “Campus
Life.” Campus Life, SAINT LOUIS UNIV., http://www.slu.edu/x24194.xml (last visited Nov. 14,
2010). There is a section on faith, but the page also contains links for Greek life, the recreation
center, residential life, clubs, and Busch Student Center, among others. Id.
142. For example, University of Missouri-Columbia, the leading state university in Missouri,
also includes information regarding religious opportunities and activities for students on its
website. Chancelor’s Diversity Initiative, UNIV. OF MO., http://diversity.missouri.edu/resources/
religious.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2010).
143. Saint Louis Univ., 220 S.W.3d at 726–29.
144. Univ. of the Cumberlands v. Pennybacker, 308 S.W.3d 668, 679 (Ky. 2010), aff’g
Pennybacker v. Beshear, No. 06-CI-00554, 2008 WL 644848 (Franklin Cir. Ct. Mar. 6, 2008).
145. Id. at 671.
146. Pennybacker, 2008 WL 644848, at *3.
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in a broad-based “liberal arts education enriched with Christian values.”147 UC
is also associated with the Kentucky Baptist Convention (KBC) and the
Southern Baptist Convention.148 In 2006, the Kentucky General Assembly
granted $10 million dollars for use in construction of a new pharmacy school
on the campus.149 The grant did not include a restriction on the use of the
building, but the university submitted a memorandum guaranteeing it would
use the building for secular education only or transfer possession to the county
if it could not meet this promise.150
Like Saint Louis University, this case was also decided under state
constitutional law.151 The Kentucky’s Right of Religious Freedom states “[n]o
preference shall ever be given by law to any religious sect, society, or
denomination . . . nor shall any person be compelled to attend any place of
worship, to contribute to the erection or maintenance of any such
place . . . .”152 And like Missouri, the Kentucky Constitution also includes a
similar specific provision with regard to government funding of education.153
Section 189 of the Kentucky Constitution creates a further restriction against
government involvement with religion, providing that “[n]o portion of any
fund or tax . . . levied for educational purposes, shall be appropriated to, or
used by, or in aid of, any church, sectarian or denominational school.”154
Despite this similarity to the Missouri provision, here the Franklin Circuit
Court ruled against the university, finding that the appropriation violated both
Sections 5 and 189 of the Kentucky Constitution.155 UC appealed the

147. Univ. of the Cumberlands, 308 S.W.3d at 671.
148. Id.
149. Id. The grant was apparently meant to help address the statewide shortage of licensed
pharmacists. It was part of a larger three-part funding plan which included 80 million dollars to
the University of Kentucky for construction of a Biological/Pharmaceutical complex and the
formation of a Pharmacy Scholarship Program, and the 10 million dollars to UC for construction
of a pharmacy school. See Brief for Appellant at 3, Univ. of the Cumberlands, 308 S.W.3d 668
(No. 2008-SC-00253-TG). The appropriation made to UC was in the form of bond financing,
where the Kentucky Infrastructure Authority sold bonds to private investors. Univ. of the
Cumberlands, 308 S.W.3d at 671. Pursuant to state law, principal was paid using taxes on coal
severance, and interest payments came from the General Fund. Id.
150. Id. at 672. The agreement was between the Commonwealth itself and the university, and
could be cancelled by either party at any time for “cause.” Pennybacker, 2008 WL 644848, at *2.
For a look at how little information the legislative grant included, see 2006 Ky. Acts 201.
151. Univ. of the Cumberlands, 308 S.W.3d at 671.
152. KY. CONST. § 5.
153. Compare KY. CONST. § 189, with MO. CONST. art. IX, § 8.
154. KY. CONST. § 189.
155. Pennybacker, 2008 WL 644848, at *2. The circuit court based this decision on Fiscal
Court of Jefferson County v. Brady, a 1994 Kentucky Supreme Court decision, which used the
entanglement prong of the Lemon test as guidance in determining that direct funding of nonpublic schools was a violation of the Kentucky constitution. Id. at *4–*5. The circuit court
believed the funding allocated to UC was exactly the kind of direct funding the Kentucky
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judgment to the court of appeals but then successfully moved to transfer the
case to the Kentucky Supreme Court.156
Unlike in Saint Louis University, the issue in this case focused not on
whether UC was a “religious” university, but whether the funds were raised for
educational purposes.157 To this end, UC argued the appropriation was
constitutional because it fulfilled a public need.158 Indeed, the Kentucky
Supreme Court has previously held “a private agency may be utilized as the
pipe-line through which a public expenditure is made, the test being not who
receives the money, but the character of the use for which it is expended.”159
UC argued that these permitted “private” institutions must necessarily also
include RACs.160 They argued that the circuit court’s interpretation of Section
189 was overbroad and would exclude religious institutions like UC from all
funding, not just from restricted educational funding.161 The university further
argued that the funds in question were not raised for “educational purposes,”
which would be restricted under Section 189, but rather that they were raised
for “health and welfare purpose[s],” to address the healthcare problem of a
statewide pharmacist shortage.162
In attacking UC’s argument on the use of the funds, Rev. Albert M.
Pennybacker and those who joined him in opposing the grant argued there was
no evidence of any shortage of pharmacists.163 They further stated that the
memorandum, meant to act as a safeguard against any secular use of the funds,
was worthless, stating that it “might as well have been written with

Supreme Court had overruled in Brady. Id. at *3–*4 (citing Fiscal Court of Jefferson Cnty. v.
Brady, 885 S.W.2d 681, 686 (Ky. 1994)).
156. Univ. of the Cumberlands, 308 S.W.3d at 671. Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure
provide that within ten days of filing an appeal with the court of appeals, a party may file a
motion for transfer to the supreme court. The supreme court retains discretion to grant or deny
the motion for transfer but will take into consideration whether the case is one of public
importance. KY. R. CIV. P. 74.02.
157. Univ. of the Cumberlands, 308 S.W.3d at 673–74.
158. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 149, at 16–17.
159. Ky. Bldg. Comm’n v. Effron, 220 S.W.2d 836, 837 (Ky. 1949).
160. Brief for Appellant, supra note 149, at 18.
161. Id. (emphasis added).
162. Id. The funding was appropriated from the Infrastructure for Economic Development
Bond Pool, a pool that was frequently used to fund projects to serve the medical and healthcare
needs of Kentucky residents. Id. at 8. Indeed, additional “pharmacy” and health related projects
were part of the same legislative grant giving UC the money for construction. See generally 2006
Ky. Acts 252.
163. Brief of Appellees at 15, Univ. of the Cumberlands v. Pennybacker, 308 S.W.3d 668
(Ky. 2010) (No. 2008-SC-00253-TG). Appellees argued that the only piece of evidence was
prepared two months after the appropriation and thus could not have been considered by the
legislature when making its decision. Id. at 5.
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disappearing ink.”164 Interestingly, in addition to the main argument focusing
on the purpose of the funds, Pennybacker also outlined that the intent of the
KBC in supporting UC was to “advance the Kingdom of God in the area of
Christian higher education.”165 As evidence of these deeply entrenched values,
Pennybacker highlighted a recent incident where the university expelled a
student purportedly for his sexual orientation.166
Though UC made a valiant technical argument for the constitutionality of
the funding, things did not look promising for the university even before an
official ruling was made. Following oral arguments before the Kentucky
Supreme Court, The Courier-Journal out of Louisville reported that several
justices were skeptical of how such funding could be allowed under the clear
language of Section 189.167 Chief Justice John Minton reportedly seemed
especially unwilling to accept the argument that “pharmacy education is not
education,” a necessary prerequisite to finding the funding constitutional.168
The Kentucky Supreme Court ultimately ruled against the university,
finding the appropriation unconstitutional.169 In reaching this decision, the
court briefly discussed the apparent religious nature of UC, finding it was
clearly a “church, sectarian, or denominational school” covered by Section
189.170 The court further stated that the memorandum UC had signed,
guaranteeing the secular use of the funds, could not change the nature of the
institution itself.171 Determining UC fell under the restriction of Section 189,
the court turned its attention to whether the funds were for the prohibited
educational purpose.172 Responding to UC’s health and welfare argument, the
court asked: How does construction of a building on campus address the
pharmacist shortage unless students are educated so they can pass the state
exam?173 The court found this case distinguishable from Kentucky Building
Commission v. Effron174 because there the funds were appropriated to a
religiously-affiliated hospital; thus the issue of whether the funds were for

164. Id. at 15. Recall that either party could cancel the agreement for cause. See supra note
150 and accompanying text.
165. Brief of Appellees, supra note 163, at 2.
166. Id. at 10.
167. Deborah Yetter, Court Hears Case of Funding for Cumberlands Pharmacy School,
COURIER-J., Sept. 25, 2009, at B5.
168. Id.
169. Univ. of the Cumberlands, 308 S.W.3d at 679.
170. Id. at 673. The court used much of the same language concerning the KBC’s purpose in
supporting UC that Pennybacker and the other appellees had included in their brief. Compare id.,
with source cited supra note 165 and accompanying text.
171. Univ. of the Cumberlands, 308 S.W.3d at 673.
172. Id. at 673–74.
173. Id. at 674 (emphasis added).
174. Ky. Bldg. Comm’n v. Effron, 220 S.W.2d 836 (Ky. 1949).
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educational purposes was not raised.175 Rather, the court equated the proposed
facility to a textbook, finding they were equally for educational purposes,176
and relied on Fannin v. Williams, where the court banned the supply of
textbooks to non-public schools,177 to find the UC funding unconstitutional
under Section 189.178
2.

Analysis of the Court’s Decision

Supporters of UC argued that Section 189 of the Kentucky Constitution
was one of the discriminatory nineteenth century Blaine Amendments which,
given the nature and history of these amendments, raised Equal Protection
concerns.179 But as evidenced by Saint Louis University, some states with
these more restrictive provisions are adjudicating constitutional challenges in a
manner that is consistent with other federal and state case law that is
permissive toward RAC funding.180 Unfortunately, the Kentucky Supreme
Court largely glossed over the issue of whether UC was a “religious”
university, taking its affiliation with the KBC as undeniable proof that it was,
forcing the outcome of this case, like so many before, to turn on the use of the
funds themselves.181 Thus, we have not been able to see where Kentucky
would stand in an examination of factors similar to those used by courts in
cases such as Saint Louis University and Horace Mann League.
Because the Kentucky Supreme Court failed to address the issue, it is
useful to independently analyze how this case may have been decided had the
doctrines of cases like Tilton, Roemer, and Saint Louis University been
applied. First, one must look at the mission statement and purpose of the
university itself. Here, UC openly promotes that it strives “to graduate men
and women with Christian values derived from spiritual and intellectual
experience within the university community as well as from the traditional
academic disciplines.”182 This commitment to Christian values attracted some
175. Univ. of the Cumberlands, 308 S.W.3d at 674 (discussing Ky. Bldg. Comm’n, 220
S.W.2d at 838).
176. Id. at 675.
177. Fannin v. Williams, 655 S.W.2d 480, 484 (Ky. 1983).
178. Univ. of the Cumberlands, 308 S.W.3d at 675, 679.
179. Brief for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants
at 5, 12, Univ. of the Cumberlands v. Pennybacker, 308 S.W.3d 668 (No. 2008-SC-000253-TG).
180. See supra Part III.A.2.
181. Univ. of the Cumberlands, 308 S.W.3d at 673.
182. UNIV. OF THE CUMBERLANDS, 2010–2011 UNDERGRADUATE CATALOG 1, available at
http://www.ucumberlands.edu/academics/catalog/2010_UG.pdf. As part of its General Education
Curriculum, all students are required to take six credit hours in Christian Faith. Id. at 30. One of
the classes toward this requirement must be either Old Testament Survey or New Testament
Survey. Id. SLU also requires nine credit hours in Theology as part of its Bachelor of Arts core
curriculum. College of Arts and Sciences Bachelor of Arts Core Curriculum Requirement, SAINT
LOUIS UNIV., http://www.slu.edu/x12584.xml (last visited Nov. 14, 2010). SLU students must
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unwanted press in 2006, after a student was reportedly expelled for violating a
university policy forbidding promotion of homosexuality after he openly
discussed his sexual orientation on a MySpace page.183 The issue hit the
papers again in 2009 when the university rescinded its offer to a Texas youth
group to come help build homes for the poor, after the group openly endorsed
homosexual behavior.184 Interestingly, UC also stated that it “encourage[d]
students to think critically and creatively . . . [to] prepare themselves for lives
of responsible service and leadership.”185 This is similar to one of the goals
stressed by SLU that helped show the court that the university was committed
to academic freedom.186 Academic freedom in areas inconsistent with core
religious values can go a long way in determining a school is not pervasively
sectarian.187 Unfortunately, the recurring intolerances at UC seem to indicate
there is not a high degree of freedom and that, perhaps, UC is incapable of
separating itself from its religious affiliation.
Next, it is helpful to look at the governing structure of the university.
Unfortunately, as this topic was not going to be addressed by the court, it was
not briefed by the parties, and therefore, there is less information available here
than in Saint Louis University. It is clear, however, that the university utilizes
several committees, the first and foremost being the President’s Cabinet.188

take THEO 100, a foundational course, followed by a 200 and 300 level course of their choice.
Id. For a Bachelor of Science at SLU, the requirement is only six hours, dropping the 300 level
course requirement. College of Arts and Sciences Bachelor of Science Core Curriculum
Requirement, SAINT LOUIS UNIV., http://www.slu.edu/x12585.xml (last visited Nov. 14, 2010).
This course requirement was not addressed by the court in Saint Louis University, but was one of
the factors listed by the court in Horace Mann League. See supra note 93 and accompanying
text. Given the large number and variety of courses offered at SLU that fulfill this requirement,
perhaps the Missouri Supreme Court did not find it problematic. Indeed, a look at the SLU
course catalog shows that students can choose from classes like American Christianity,
Jerusalem: City of Three Faiths, African American Christian Traditions, and Religion and
Science.
SAINT LOUIS UNIV., COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES UNDERGRADUATE
CATALOGUE: THEOLOGY 1, 3, available at http://www.slu.edu/x30851.xml. The relatively small
number of courses available to UC students to fulfill the requirement could have weighed
negatively against the university. See UNIV. OF THE CUMBERLANDS, supra, at 30.
183. Mark Pitsch, Student Expelled from University of Cumberlands for Being Gay,
COURIER-J., Apr. 11, 2006, at B1.
184. David Hawpe, A Lesson in Love at University of the Cumberlands, COURIER-J., July 8,
2009, at A6.
185. UNIV. OF THE CUMBERLANDS, supra note 182, at 3.
186. See supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
188. UNIV. OF THE CUMBERLANDS, STANDING COMMITTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE
CUMBERLANDS, 2009–2010, available at http://www.ucumberlands.edu/faculty/downloads/
committeelist.pdf (listing the positions and responsibilities of each committee and the names of
its members for the current academic year). In addition to the President’s Cabinet, other
committees include Academic Appeals, Athletic, Catalog and Curriculum, Cultural Arts, and
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The President’s Cabinet is responsible for overseeing day-to-day activities and
creating a strategic plan for the future.189 It is made up of nine officers of the
university, including the university president.190 Sadly, there is no readilyavailable information on the religious affiliation of the members of the
President’s Cabinet, nor on whether the Cabinet must report to the KBC. It is
hard to determine, therefore, if UC has the kind of independent governance
necessary to show it is not religiously controlled.
Finally, it is useful to evaluate the image promoted by the school on its
website and how that compares with SLU. Like SLU, visitors to the UC
website are greeted by a banner of pictures and information.191 Highlighted
information includes university news, an emergency notification system, and a
calendar of upcoming events.192 Also like SLU and other universities, campus
ministry is listed under the student life page alongside other secular campus
activities and organizations, without overpowering them.193 Overall, UC’s
website is quite similar to SLU’s and promotes an image of a well-rounded
university rather than a “religious” university.194
Despite the promising evaluation of the image of the university, there are
several factors that weigh negatively on UC. The pattern of intolerance for
views and lifestyles contrary to Christian teachings, the clear support of the
KBC, and the undetermined level of independence of the President’s Cabinet
seem to indicate that UC may be inseparably entwined with its religious
affiliation. With such apparent intertwining and a lack of clear message from
the university on academic freedom, it is likely that even a jurisdiction such as
Missouri or Maryland would find UC pervasively religious and the funding
unconstitutional. But what if the facts had been slightly different? What if
those reports of intolerance had been instances of acceptance? What if there
was extensive evidence of academic freedom and governing independence?
Under these circumstances, a court like Missouri may have found the funding
constitutional. But unfortunately, it is unclear when, if ever, we will get
Kentucky’s view on the issue.

Faculty Development. Id. Faculty members may serve on many of the sub-committees, but only
the university officers serve on the President’s Cabinet. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. The cabinet is composed of the President, Vice President (VP) for Academic Affairs,
VP for Student Services, VP for Institutional Advancement, VP for Finance, VP for Operations,
VP for Business Services, VP for Financial Planning, and the Athletic Director. Id.
191. UNIV. OF THE CUMBERLANDS, http://www.ucumberlands.edu (last visited Nov. 14,
2010).
192. Id.
193. Student Life, UNIV. OF THE CUMBERLANDS, http://www.ucumberlands.edu/students (last
visited Nov. 14, 2010).
194. See supra notes 139–42 and accompanying text.
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IV. LOOKING FORWARD: HOW TO EQUALIZE THE OUTCOMES OF RAC
FUNDING DISPUTES
The above case studies highlight the disparity in state adjudication of
challenges to government funding of RACs. The question now becomes, is
there a way to ensure Equal Protection when plaintiffs challenge RAC funding
under state constitutional rights? As discussed in Part II.A, a state court
decision based on complementary state law is considered “adequate and
independent grounds” and, thus, is unreviewable by the Supreme Court.195
Does this mean there is nothing that can be done to alleviate the inequality
currently seen among the states?
The United States Constitution by no means requires states to provide
financial assistance to private schools—regardless of whether the school is
religiously affiliated or secular in nature.196 But, it does demand neutrality.
According to Professor Stephen Carter, this means “government cannot take
steps to treat religious schools better than other schools, . . . [nor] take steps to
treat religious schools worse.”197 Thus, Carter argues, if the state chooses to
make public aid available to secular private schools, it would be discriminatory
not to offer the same aid to religious schools.198 This is the general argument
against the Blaine Amendments, since such amendments tend to single out
religious or denominational institutions for the prohibition of state or public
aid.199 Because of this discriminatory nature, there have been numerous
challenges to these amendments.
Opponents have tried challenging the constitutionality of these state
provisions under both the Free Exercise200 and Equal Protection201 clauses.
The court recently rejected a Free Exercise challenge in Locke v. Davey202 and
instead seemed to show support for state covenants prohibiting funding
religious schools and programs, stating, “we can think of few areas in which a
State’s antiestablishment interests come more into play.”203 Others have

195. See text accompanying note 89.
196. DeForrest, supra note 77, at 608.
197. Id. (quoting STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW
AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 200 (1993)).
198. Id. at 608–09.
199. Id. at 607–08.
200. U.S. CONST. amend. I. This provision is the second religion clause in the First
Amendment immediately following the Establishment Clause. The provision reads, “Congress
shall make no law prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].” Id.
201. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
202. See generally Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (finding that a Washington
scholarship program that prohibited giving funds to students pursuing a devotional or theological
degree did not violate the Free Exercise Clause).
203. Id. at 722. The court, thus, found that the state had a substantial interest in imposing the
restriction while the statute placed only a minor burden upon recipients. Id. at 725. Indeed,
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argued the state provisions violate the Equal Protection Clause. For example,
in University of the Cumberlands, The Becket Fund, as amicus curie, argued
that Section 189 raised serious Equal Protection concerns and urged the
Kentucky Supreme Court to interpret the provision narrowly to avoid
conflicting with the federal constitution.204 But even if the Supreme Court
were to find a violation of the Equal Protection clause, that may not alleviate
the problem. The Becket Fund noted that approximately 99% of Kentucky K12 students attending private school were attending a non-secular school.205 In
addition, Kentucky has over thirty private colleges and universities, several of
which are religiously-affiliated, even if only maintaining historic ties and no
longer adhering to a religious creed.206 By simply denying funding to all
private schools, a state like Kentucky can maintain its disproportionate
discriminatory ban on funding religious schools and circumvent Equal
Protection, as it is not required to fund private schools at all.207
Perhaps fighting to extinguish these state provisions through federal action
is not the answer. Cases like Maryland’s Horace Mann League and Missouri’s
Saint Louis University show that a restrictive state provision on funding
“religion” does not necessarily bar finding in favor of the RAC under proper
circumstances.208 The key is how the court addresses the question. Where the
court analyzes the underlying nature of the recipient of the funding, such as in
Saint Louis University, the results among states are more equal. But where the
focus is on the use of funds—the type and location of a proposed building
project, the purchase of textbooks, or the provision of transportation for school
children—the results can vary widely. Thus, courts should focus on
harmonizing the adjudication of claims, making sure that courts examine the
true nature of an institution, so that similar universities receive equal treatment
across the country.

recipients were not barred from attending pervasively religious schools, from practicing any given
religion, or from taking theological courses. Id. at 724–25. The only restriction was they could
not use the funds to pursue a theological major or degree. Id. at 725 n.9.
204. Brief for The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, supra note 179, at 12, 15.
205. Id. at 12.
206. See Paolo Turchioe, The Best Religiously Affiliated Colleges, FORBES.COM (May 21,
2010, 5:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/05/21/religiously-affiliated-colleges-leadershipeducation-best.html. Some of the oldest universities in America were founded by religious
orders. Id. Many have severed formal ties, maintaining only loose historic ties, and like SLU, no
longer govern subject to a religious creed. Id. Indeed several RACs have esteemed reputations
for strong academics. Id. But the highest ranked RAC in the country is Centre College located in
Danville, Kentucky. Id. Centre College, which maintains only historic ties to its Presbyterian
founding, ranked ahead of even big name RACs, like Boston College and Notre Dame. Id.
207. See supra notes 195–97 and accompanying text.
208. Saint Louis Univ. v. Masonic Temple Ass’n of St. Louis, 220 S.W.3d 721, 729 (Mo.
2007); Horace Mann League v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 220 A.2d 51, 76 (Md. 1966).
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CONCLUSION
The fight over separation of church and state is one of the oldest in
America. It is a fight that stems back to the debate between the Federalists and
Anti-Federalists on whether to even include a provision on religious freedom
in the Constitution.209 It is a question that has plagued the Court equally as
long, requiring it to determine what constitutes “establishment” of religion or
what action presents undue government “entanglement” in religion. With the
passage of the Higher Education Acts in the 1960s, government funding of
religious schools—and more specifically RACs—became a hot button issue in
the courts.210 The Supreme Court has chosen a path of neutrality on the issue,
holding that so long as the institution is not “pervasively sectarian” and can
show an independent, dominant academic purpose, the funding is
constitutional.
But the dual system of government creates new challenges for RACs
hoping to receive public funding. In the 1800s, several states amended their
constitutions to include more restrictive provisions on government action and
aid with respect to religion and religiously affiliated organizations, like
universities.211 Since this time, the ability of a RAC to overcome a state
constitutional challenge to public funding has been severely curtailed. In the
last fifty years, state courts have made great strides in the way they adjudicate
these claims, some even using guidelines similar to the federal courts. But
even today, RACs facing a challenge to proposed funding in different states
that have similar constitutional provisions may receive unequal treatment. The
key to resolving this issue is to standardize the way in which courts approach
the issue—to look at the true nature of the recipient rather than accepting a
religious affiliation at face value.
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